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The Illusion of Stabilization Policy?
ABSTRACT
For the period 1959—1972 money growth in the United States
was positively correlated with past inflation and negatively
correlated with past unemployment, whereas for the period 1973—
1984 this correlation pattern was reversed. International data,
moreover, show that the eight largest western economies exhibit a
wide variety of patterns for these correlations, and these
patterns seem to be unrelated to average inflation. Theoretical
analysis reveals that a model in which the monetary authority is
concerned only with controlling inflation is consistent withany
pattern of sample correlations of money growth with past
inflation and past unemployment. This analysis suggests that
international differences in these sample correlations result
from differences in the sample variances of disturbances to
productivity growth and to aggregate demand. Specifically, the
analysis suggests that the critical difference between the pre—
1973 and post—1973 periods for the United States was a decrease
in the importance of transitory disturbances to aggregate demand
relative to permanent disturbances to productivity growth. More
generally, these results imply that we cannot readily infer the









Providence, RI 029121. Inflation and Patterns of Money Growth
For the period 1959—1972 money growth in the United States
was positively correlated with past inflation and negatively
correlated with past unemployment, whereas for the period 1973—
1984 this correlation pattern was reversed. Moreover,as
summarized in the table, international data show that the eight
largest western economics exhibit a wide variety of patterns for
these correlations. This paper develops a positive theoretical
model of monetary policy that shows that intertemporal and
international differences in these sample correlations can result
from differences in the sample variances of disturbances to
productivity growth and to aggregate demand. The distinctive
feature of this model is the assumption that monetary authorities
behave as if their sole objective was the achievement of a given
target path for inflation.
This parsimonious theoretical specification of the
objectives of monetary policy contrasts sharply with theories
that attribute observed patterns of monetary growth toalleged
stabilization objectives.In a widely accepted example of such
an analysis, John Taylor (1981, 1982) characterizes monetary
policy in the United States as excessively accommodative of
inflation, and he attributes this defect to overzealous attempts
to prevent negative supply shocks, which are inflationary, from
eroding real money balances, depressing aggregate demand, and
increasing unemployment.
Taylor's assumption that the Federal Reserve has behaved as
if it is greatly concerned about unemployment suggests a positive
response of money growth to increases in both inflation and
unemployment. But, as the table indicates, positive correlations
of money growth with past inflation and past unemployment are not
a persistent feature of the data either for the United States or











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































provide an example in which both of these correlations are
positive. Most notably, although the sample correlation ofmoney
growth with past inflation for the United States is positive for
the entire interval 1959—84, during the period 1973—85, when
apparently large negative supply shocks occurred, this sample
correlation was negative. Moreover, during the earlier period,
1959—72, when the correlation of money growth with past inflation
was highly positive, the correlation of money growth with past
unemployment was negative.
In addition, Taylor's argument that accommodation of
inflation is responsible for excessive inflation suggests a
positive relation between the correlation of money growth with
past inflation and the average inflation rate. The table shows
that money growth is positively correlated with recent past
inflation in the United Kingdom and France, both of which had
relatively high average inflation, and that money growth is
uncorrelated with recent past inflation in West Germany and
Switzerland, which were the economies with lowest average
inflation. The data for other counties, however, contradict this
pattern. The correlation between money growth and past inflation
is positive for the United States in the earlier period and for
the Netherlands, both of which had lower average inflation than
the United States in the later period, and is negative for both
Canada, which had higher average inflation than the United
States, and Italy, which had the highest average inflation.
The international data also show a similar absence of a
clear relation between average inflation and the responsiveness
of money growth to past unemployment. Canada is the only
economy, besides the United States for the later period, for
which money growth is positively correlated with past
unemployment.In Italy, the highest inflation economy, this
correlation is negative. It is also worth noting that the
patterns of correlation of money growth with past growth rates of
aggregate output show a similar absence of any clear relation to—3—
average inflation. These findings imply that neither the
positive correlations of money growth with past inflation in
France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands nor the high
average inflation in Italy, France, and the United Kingdom is a
consequence of zealous concern for stabilizing unemployment (or
output growth).
Another problem with Taylor's argument is that it leads to
the question of why the Federal Reserve has persistently followed
an inefficient policy. Taylor suggests "that at least until
recently, the superiority of the less—accommodative policy has
not generally been realized or believed" (1982, p. 84). This
explanation accords with standard monetarist criticisms of
Federal Reserve policy, perhaps best exemplified in the
historical research of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), that
attribute bad monetary policy to idiosyncratic shortcomings of
the monetary authorities, especially ignorance and perhaps also
cowardice. A complementary line of historical analysis argues
that bad policy results from perverse bureaucratic incentives——
see, for example, Toma (1982, 1985). Both of these theories of
excessive inflation imply that the solution to the alleged
problem of inefficient accommodation of inflation is the
promulgation of laws that effectively constrain the monetary
authority to pursue efficient policies. A difficulty with these
theories as positive economics is that they provide no
explanation for the absence of such apparently desirable laws,
beyond the implication that the basic problem is that the higher
political authorities and the public are unenlightened.
Another theory that emphasizes concern about unemployment,
developed in the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro
and Gordon (August 1983), focuses on assumed incentives for the
monetary authority to produce unanticipated inflation and
attributes inefficient monetary policy to the consequent time—
inconsistency of efficient monetary policy. Barro and Gordon
suggest that negative productivity innovations that—4—
contemporaneously increase both unemployment and inflation also
increase the incentive for the Federal Reserve to try to produce
unanticipated inflation, with the result of higher money growth
and inflation in subsequent periods.But, as we have seen, no
pattern of persistently positive correlations of money growth
with past inflation and past unemployment is evident in the data.
The analysis that follows identifies factors that are
unrelated to stabilization objectives and average inflation and
that provide a general explanation for correlations of money
growth with past inflation and past unemployment and for
international differences in these correlations. This analysis
focuses on hypothetical differences in the sample variances of
disturbances to productivity growth and to aggregate demand. To
sharpen this focus, the analysis assumes that the only objective
for monetary policy is the achievement of a given target time
path for inflation. Importantly, the analysis abstracts from
perversity or stupidity on the part of monetary authorities or
the public and from time—consistency problems associated with
incentives to produce unanticipated inflation.
2.Analytical Framework
Consider the following setup, which, although simple, is
quite general and includes as special cases the essential
properties of several well known models. The key assumptions
about the proximate determination of wages and employment are the
setting of the nominal wage rate in period t equal to the
rational expectation of its market—clearing level conditional on
information available in period t—i,
(1) = i=0,1,2,
the production function relating output to employment of labor
services and to other factors,—5—
(2) =
aNt+ Z, 0 < a < 1,
and the setting of employment and output to equate the marginal
product of labor services to the real wage rate,
(3) Nt =(i—a)'(Pt
— +in a + Zt),
where is the log of the nominal wage rate in
period t,
is the log of the nominal wage rate that would
be consistent with clearing the labor market in
period t,
Et. is an operator that denotes an expectation
conditional on information available in period
t—i,
is the log of output in period t,
Nt is the log of employment of labor services in
period t,
measures the total effect of exogenous
stochastic variables that influence labor
productivity in period t,
and Pt is the log of the output price level in period
t.
The results reported by Nelson and Plosser (1982) suggest
the specification that the growth rate of productivity, LxZ, is
the sum of a permanent component, assumed to be a random
walk with innovation ,anda transitory component, Z,
assumed to be a white noise —thatis,
(4) = +z =_1 +Et + Z,
where and z have zero means and stationary variances
V(s) and V(z) and are uncorrelated serially and with other random
variables.—6—
The analysis assumes that the monetary authority revises
policy at a regular interval.In this framework, this decision—
making interval defines the length of a period. Thus, monetary
policy in period t is based on information available in period
t—1.
Within this framework, three special cases of equation (1),
which differ according to the value of the parameter i, are
worth noting:
(a)If i equals zero, the nominal wage rate responds to
current information. In this case, forecast errors made by
private agents play no role. Actual employment always equals the
supply of labor services and changes in employment and output
correspond to changes in labor supply and productivity.
(b) If i equals unity, the nominal wage rate is
predetermined, but wage setting and policy making are
synchronized. In this case, given that employment adjusts to
equate the marginal product and the real wage rate, unanticipated
realizations of either output price or productivity can cause
actual employment to differ from the supply of labor services.
Nevertheless, because, with i equal to unity, the monetary
authority has no informational advantage, monetary policy does
not systematically affect employment and output.[Although this
model focuses on the unpredictability of labor demand, rather
than on incomplete contemporaneous information, the main
implications in this case are isomorphic to those of the classic
equilibrium monetary business cycle models——for example, Lucas
(1973) and Barro (1976).]
(c) Ifi equals two or more, not only is the nominal wage
rate predetermined, but the monetary authority also reacts to new
information more frequently than nominal wages are adjusted.
[The seminal paper by Fischer (1977), integrating rational
expectations into a Keynesian framework, analyzed this case.
This informational advantage means that the monetary authority's—7—
systematic policy of controlling inflation can have side effects
on unemployment. The analysis that follows uses this case. For
simplicity, it assumes thati equals two.
The first step in analyzing the implications of equations
(1) —(3)is to determine the market—clearing wage rate by
substituting the supply of labor services, denoted N*, for
Nt in equation (3) and solving for
(5) W Pt +ina +Z
—(1_a)N*.
For simplicity, the analysis treats labor supply as constant.
The next step is to determine the actual nominal wage rate by
applying the operator Et2 to equation (5) and substituting
into equation (1) to get
(6) =Et2Pt +ina +Et2Z —(l_a)N*.
To determine employment substitute equation (6) into
equation (3), which yields
(7)Nt —N*=(l_a)'(PtEt2Pt +— Et2Zt).
Equation (7) indicates that the difference between actual
employment and labor supply is proportionate to the sum of wage
setterst forecast errors for the output price level and for
productivity. Specifically, positive forecast errors for output
price and productivity cause excess employment. The forecast
error in productivity reflects exogenous innovations in the
components of The forecast error in output price remains
to be analyzed. Finally, to determine unemployment, define
to be the deviation in the log of unemployment from a
constant (equilibrium) level associated with equality between
Nt and N*, and assume that—8—
(8)Ut =— (N_N*).
The remaining elements in specifying the behavior ofprivate
agents are the assumption that output price adjusts each period
to equate actual output and output demand, and ageneral




where Mt is the log of a nominal monetaryaggregate in period
t and X measures the total effect of other variables that
influence output demand. For simplicity, the analysisassumes
that k equals unity. This assumption means that theanalysis
abstracts from induced, as opposed to autonomous, changes in
velocity and also from the effect of current productivity
innovations on employment.(With k equal to unity, the
increase in the price level resulting from a negativeproductity
innovation is just enough to reduce realwages in line with the
reduction in the marginal product of labor services, so that
employment does not change. )Theanalysis also assumes that the
demand disturbance is the sum of a permanent component,
Dt, assumed to be a random walk with innovation and a




where e andx have zero means and stationary variances V(e)
and V(x) and are uncorrelated serially and with other random
variables.
The distinctive feature of the model is the assumption that
the only objective of the monetary authority in period t—1 is to
set Mt to achieve an exogenous target value, denoted by
for the inflation rate from period t—1 to period t.The—9—
assumption that the inflation target is exogenous——specifically,
independent of the time series of unemployment——ensures that the
inflation target is not acting as a proxy for a stabilization
objective. Assume also that monetary control is precise and that
the information set of private agents in period t—l includes
lit—'.
Although monetary control is precise, because Z and X
are stochastic variables, the monetary authority in general
cannot achieve its inflation target exactly. Nevertheless, it
can set Mt to equate expected inflation to the target——that is,
Et_iPt ——, = 11_Given that inflation deviates from its
target value by only a white—noise forecast error, the time
series properties of actual inflation suggest the specification
oflit as an autoregressive process. For simplicity, however,
the analysis assumes that the inflation target is constant——that
is, ll =TIfor all t. Accordingly, expectations about the
price level are
(11)Et,Pt = + II and
(12)Et2Pt =t—2
+2n.
3. Correlations of Money Growth with Past Inflation and Past
Unemployment
The analysis of the model given by equations (1) through
(12) involves solving for current money growth, past inflation,
and past unemployment in terms of realizations of the exogenous
random shocks, and using these solutions to calculate the implied
covariances between current money growth and past inflation and
between current money growth and past unemployment. Substituting









Applying the operator Et_i to equation (13) yields, after





+a(1_a)'(EtiPt —Et2Pt +Et1Z —E2Zt).
Equation (14) says that the monetary authority's choice ofMt
depends on the price level in period b-i and on the monetary
authority's inflation target, on its forecasts of productivity,
output demand, and labor supply for period t, and on the
difference between its current forecasts of prices and
productivity in period t and the forecasts on which nominal
wages for period t were based.
Substituting equation (14) for Mt into equation (13)




Equation (15) says that either a negative forecast error for
productivity or a positive forecast error for demand causes
inflation to exceed the monetary authority's target.
Finally, substituting equation (7) for and equation
(12) for Et_2Pt into equation (8) gives
(16)Ut =— (1—a)(APt—+ APti —II+
Et2Zt).— 11—
Equation(16) says that either inflation below its target or a
negative forecast error for productivity cause unemployment to
exceed its constant equilibrium level.
To calculate the relevant covariances for a simple, but
revealing, case assume that the information set of all agents in
period t—i includes the permanent and transitory components of
and Given the stochastic processes specified by
equations (4) and (9), this assumption implies that
Et_iZt












[If,in contrast to this specification, the information set of
wage setters and the monetary authority does not include the
permanent and transitory components of the disturbances, then
realized forecast errors would exhibit signs of positive serial
correlation in a small sample that contained one or more dominant
large innovations to one or both of the permanent components.
The important papers by Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer (1980,
1983) analyze various implications of this effect, although they
treatmoney growth as exogenous rather than, as in the present
model,as derived from the objectives of the monetary authority.]— 12—
Differencingequation (14) and backdating equations (15) and
(16), after combining these equations and substituting the above
expressions for the expectations and the forecast errors, yields
(17) =++ (lc_1+
+ x1—a(et2+xt2).
(18) =— 6—r Z1 + (l_cz)(eti+xti),and
(19)Ut_i =— [(1_a)'t2+e1+x1+e2+x2}.
Equations (17), (18), and (19) imply
(20) cov(M, =(1—a)V(c)+(1—a)V(x)and
(21) cov(M, °ti =(2a—1)(1—)2V(c)+aV(e)—V(x).
Equations (20) and (21) express the covariances of money
growth with past inflation and past unemployment as linear
functions of the variances of the underlying random variables.
Depending on the relative size of these underlying variances, the
two covariances of interest can be positive, negative, or zero.
The relations between the underlying variances and the two
covariances of interest arise as follows:
A negative disturbance to productivity growth in period t—1
causes output growth to be low and inflation to be high in
period t—1.If the disturbance to productivity growth is
transitory, i.e., a negative realization ofz1, the monetary
authority in periodt—1 expects inflation to decrease to its
previous rate in period t without any adjustment inmoney
growth.If, alternatively, the disturbance to productivity
growth was permanent, i.e., a negative realization of the— 13—
monetaryauthority in period t—l expects that, without any
adjustment in money growth, output growth would continue to be
low and inflation would continue to be high in period t.
Accordingly, in order to achieve its inflation target, the
monetary authority would decrease money growth in period t.In
this way, permanent disturbances to productivity growth in
period t—1 cause high inflation in period t—l to be
associated with low money growth in period t.
This reduction in money growth in period t, which wage
setters in period t—2 did not anticipate, causes unemployment
temporarily to be high in period t.The monetary authority in
period t, consequently, expects two opposing influences on
inflation in period t+1. The continuing low productivity growth
will tend to make inflation high, whereas the recovery of
employment will tend to make inflation low. Accordingly, whether
or not, in order to achieve its inflation target, the monetary
authority keeps money growth low in period t+1 depends on the
size of the parameter a.To the extent that the parameter a
exceeds one—half, the effect of the recovery of employment
dominates, and permanent disturbances to productivity growth in
period t—1 cause high unemployment in period t to be
associated with high money growth in period t+1.
A positive disturbance to demand in period t—1 also causes
inflation to be high in period t—l.If the disturbance to
demand is transitory, i.e., a positive realization of x1i the
monetary authority in period t—l expects demand to decline in
period t.Accordingly, to achieve its inflation target, the
monetary authority would increase money growth in period t.In
this way, transitory disturbances to demand period t—l cause
high inflation in period t—l to be associated with high money
growth in period t.If, alternatively, the disturbance to
demand is permanent, i.e., a positive realization of e1 the
monetary authority in period t—1 expects demand to remain— 14—
constantand inflation to decrease to its previous rate in
period t without any change in money growth.
Positive disturbances to demand in period t—1 also cause
unemployment to be low and output to be high in periods t—l
and t.Thus, transitory disturbances in demand in period t—l
cause low unemployment in period t—1 to be associated with high
money growth in period t.The monetary authority in period
t, however, expects unemployment to return to its normal level
and output growth to be low in period t+1. Accordingly, the
monetary authority in period t expects that, without any
adjustment in money growth, inflation would be high in period
t+1. To achieve its inflation target, it would decrease money
growth in period t+1.In this way, disturbances to demand in
period t--1, either permanent or transitory, cause low
unemployment in period t to be associated with low money growth
in period t+1. The net effect is that permanent disturbances to
demand cause positive comovements of money growth and past
unemployment, whereas, given that ais less than unity,
transitory disturbances to demand cause negative comovements of
money growth with past unemployment.
This analysis suggests that intertemporal and international
differences in the pattern of correlation of money growth with
past inflation and with past unemployment can result from
international differences in the relative magnitudes of the
sample variances of the underlying permanent and transitory
disturbances. Equations (20) and (21) indicate that in this
model the critical factor is the magnitude of transitory
disturbances to demand, given by V(x), relative to the
magnitudes of permanent disturbances to demand and to
productivity, given by V(e) and V(c). Specifically, the
analysis suggests that the change in the pattern of correlation
in the United States from the earlier to later period results
from a decrease in V(x) relative to both V(e) and V(s).— 15—
Asexplanations for the pattern of correlations for the
other economies, assuming that is about one—half, the
analysis suggests that in Italy V(x) was larger than V(e) but
smaller than four times V(c), that in the United Kingdom,
France, and the Netherlands V(x) was large relative to V(c)
but was about the same size as V(e), that in Canada, as in the
United States for the later period, V(x) was smaller than
V(e) and smaller than four times V(€), and that in Switzerland
and West Germany V(x) was about equal to V(e) and also about
equal to four times V(c).
5. Summary
International data show that the eight largest western
economics exhibit a wide variety of patterns for the correlations
of money growth with past inflation and past unemployment and
that these patterns seem to be unrelated to average inflation.
Theoretical analysis shows that a model in which the monetary
authority behaves as if its sole objective is control of
inflation is consistent with any pattern of correlations of money
growth with past inflation and past unemployment. Moreover, this
analysis suggests that intertemporal and international
differences in these sample correlations result from differences
in the sample variances of disturbances to productivity growth
and to aggregate demand. Specifically, the analysis suggests
that the critical difference between the pre—1973 and post—1973
periods for the United States was a decrease in the importance of
transitory disturbances to aggregate demand relative to permanent
disturbances to aggregate demand and to productivity growth.
More generally, these results imply that we cannot readily
inter the objectives of the monetary authority from observed
patterns of monetary policy. Specifically, the idea that
monetary policy, either in the United States or in other
countries, has attempted to stabilize real activity and to
control unemployment may he an illusion.— 16—
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